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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAND JURY 
TESTIMONY: THE UNAVAILABLE 
WITNESS, CONFRONTATION, AND DUE 
PROCESS 
The grand jury plays a critical role in the administration of criminal 
justice in both federal and state systems. 1 It is used to investigate 
suspected crimes and to determine whether sufficient evidence exists 
to indict and proceed to trial. 2 In addition, testimony heard at grand 
jury proceedings often provides valuable assistance to parties during 
1. For federal felony prosecutions, indictment by grand jury is required by the fifth amend-
ment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Indictment may be waived for noncapital offenses and prosecu-
tion by information substituted. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a), (b). Indictment by grand jury is unusual 
in that, unlike other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, it does not apply to state prosecutions 
through the fourteenth amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. S 16 (1884); accord Gerstein 
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). About twenty states still require felony indictments by grand jury 
(and five more require it for capital offenses), while the rest allow charges to be brought by 
information and use grand juries only occasionally, usually for investigative purposes rather than 
for screening prosecutions. Y. KAMISAR. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
712-13, 1016 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL PROCEDURE). 
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 712. 
Criticism of prosecution by indictment is largely responsible for the shift among states toward 
prosecution by information. When the fifth amendment was ratified, all fifty states required 
indictments in felony cases. Anti-indictment sentiment became strong in the early 1930's, but 
the state trend toward prosecution by information has slackened. Debate on constitutional and 
statutory reforms, however, continues. Id. at 1016. See generally M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS. 
THE GRAND JURY (1977); Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, Sl 
A.B.A.J. 153 (1965); Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1980); 
Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973); Morris, Book 
Review, 87 YALE L.J. 680 (1978). 
The grand jury is characterized as both a "sword" and a "shield." United States v. Cox, 
342 F.2d 167, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1965). In its earliest English form, jurors were subservient to 
the king. They could accuse based on their own knowledge-as well as investigate charges brought 
by outsiders. The evolution of the institution into a bulwark against government oppression was 
dramatized five hundred years later, in 1681, when a grand jury refused to indict Lord Shaftesbury 
for treason, despite pressure from Charles II. This protective function was imported to the New 
World: 
Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against 
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our 
society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an in-
dividual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon 
reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will. 
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). Today, many argue that the grand jury has ceased 
to screen effectively and serves instead as a weapon of the prosecution. See infra notes 65-76 
and accompanying text. See generally M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra, at 6-17, 99-102; R. 
YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 1-4 (1963); Arenella, supra, at 474. 
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subsequent stages of litigation. 3 Defendants, for example, may wish 
to review grand jury transcripts in order to challenge an indictment 
or to help prepare a defense. 4 At the trial itself, if a grand jury witness 
appears, both prosecution and defense can use the prior testimony as 
substantive evidence, s for impeachment purposes, 6 or to refresh a 
witness's memory. 7 
On occasion, grand jury testimony is introduced at trial when the 
grand jury witness is unavailable8 to testify in person. In this situa-
tion, the grand jury transcript is particularly useful to the prosecution, 
for it may represent the best evidence at its disposal. 9 Although the 
absence of the witness renders the grand jury testimony hearsay, 10 some 
courts have admitted it under an exception to the hearsay rule. 11 In 
3. Both the existence and availability of transcripts varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Transcription of grand jury testimony is required in the federal system, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 
and in about thirty states. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PRINCIPLES 12 (1977). Transcription is _fairly 
common in other jurisdictions, at the prosecutor's discretion. While some jurisdictions allow 
defendants access to the entire transcript following indictment, others disclose only the testimony 
of witnesses who testify at trial, absent a special showing of need. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra 
note I, at 1026 n.c., 1055. The grand jury transcript may figure prominently in collateral pro-
ceedings as well, particularly those involving the scope of a witness's immunity or perjury. Id. at 748. 
4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note I, at 1167. 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
920 (1980); United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Mosley, 555· F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1978); United States v. 
De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977). 
7. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 (1940); Tolbert v. Jago, 607 
F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022 (1979). 
8. "Unavailable" is a term of art and the precise definition varies according to a particular 
jurisdiction's rules of evidence. FED. R. Evm. 804(a) provides that: 
'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant - (I) is exemp-
ted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the 
subject matter of his statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the sub-
ject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies to 
a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or (4) is unable to be present 
or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness 
or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has 
been unable to procure his attendance ... by process or other reasonable means. A 
declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of 
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the propo-
nent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or 
testifying. 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Barlow, 
693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Carlson, 
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 
F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
10. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evm. 
S0l(c). 
11. The relevant federal provision is FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5): 
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United States v. West, 12 for example, the Fourth Circuit approved the 
admission of the grand jury testimony of a witness who had been slain 
before the trial. The court held that the testimony was "essentially 
trustworthy'' despite its hearsay status. 13 
Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections 
to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is un-
available to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confronta-
tion clause14 of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses 15 of 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that 
the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which can-
not be subjected to cross-examination 16 fatally compromises the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand 
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [is not excluded as hearsay] if 
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice wilf best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence. 
Courts disagree on the scope of this exception, some construing it to encompass the grand jury 
testimony of unavailable witnesses and others holding to the contrary. Compare United States 
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982), and United States v. 
Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980), (suggesting the rule 
should be interpreted narrowly), with United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978), 
United States v. Gamer, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978), and United 
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (grand jury 
testimony can meet the rule's "trustworthiness" requirement). See also McKethan v. United States, 
439 U.S. 936, 939 n.3 (1978) (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (ques-
tioning whether FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5) was intended to provide case-by-case exceptions rather 
than categoric expansion of hearsay exceptions). Cf. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7065-66 (suggesting that use of the 
residual hearsay exception will be rare). 
Although interpreting this hearsay exception and comparable state provisions is an important 
issue, it is beyond the scope of this Note to determine whether grand jury testimony satisfies 
the statutory requirements of a particular jurisdiction. Rules of evidence are subject to revision 
within the limits imposed by the Constitution; it is those limits which this Note explores. See 
the discussion of the relationship between hearsay and the confrontation clause irifra notes 20-28 
and accompanying text. 
12. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978). 
13. See supra note 1 1. 
In a companion case, United States v. Gamer, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 936 (1978), the Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction for the importation of heroin, relying 
in part on a co-conspirator's grand jury testimony. Although the co-conspirator was physically 
present, see supra note 8, his refusal to answer questions prompted resort to the grand jury 
transcript. 
14. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him . . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The protection is applicable 
to the state prosecutions through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
15. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
16. See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text. 
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jury testimony in these circumstances, 11 and the Supreme Court has 
yet to rule on the issue. 18 As a result, trial judges are left with little 
guidance as they grapple with evidentiary disputes amidst the pressures 
of criminal prosecutions. This Note argues that the confrontation clause 
normally bars grand jury testimony, but that it may be admissible when 
a defendant has waived his confrontation rights and an independent 
standard of due process is satisfied. Part I discusses the framework 
for confrontation analysis established by the Supreme Court in the con-
text of preliminary hearings 19 and applies it to the grand jury setting. 
This section concludes that grand jury testimony does not meet the 
Court's test for reliability and therefore should not, as a general matter, 
be admissible at a later trial. Part II goes beyond the issue of confronta-
tion and examines the additional considerations important for due pro-
cess analysis if a defendant waives the right to confront. 
17. The Fourth Circuit has approved the use of grand jury testimony on several occasions. 
United States v. Murphy, 6% F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 
(4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 
(1978). The Second Circuit has held that grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness is not 
admissible, although that decision predates adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and was 
apparently based on an interpretation of the hearsay rule as well as the confrontation clause. 
United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). Under 
special circumstances, grand jury testimony has been admitted by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits. See United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) (testimony met the 
confrontation clause's "reliability" standard); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.) 
(evidence was "clear and convincing" that the defendant had waived his confrontation right 
and no due process violation existed), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); Tolbert v. Jago, 
607 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that although a jury may have considered the substan-
tive content of grand jury testimony in violation of instructions, admission was constitutional 
due to special circumstances), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022 (1980); United States v. Balano, 618 
F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that a defendant's threats on a witness's life may constitute 
a waiver of confrontation rights, justifying the admission of grand jury testimony), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1978) (admitting a co-
defendant's prior grand jury testimony violated the defendant's confrontation right, which was 
not implicitly waived by his failure to move for a severance); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 
F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (no need to reach confrontation issue because introduction of grand 
jury testimony violated the hearsay rule); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(grand jury testimony held properly admitted after a hearing determining that threats by the 
defendant were the likely cause of the witness's refusal to testify at trial), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 
914 (1977). 
18. McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (noting that the Courts of Appeals are split and that both the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the sixth amendment may place limits on the use of grand jury testimony); 
see also Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1019 (1978) (White & Blackmun, 
JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting that McKethan was suitable for a grant 
of certiorari). 
19. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). These 
preliminary hearing decisions are particularly helpful in exploring the issue of grand jury testimony 
because the two types of proceedings often serve the same function - screening cases to deter-
mine whether to proceed with a prosecution. See infra notes 60-98 and accompanying texL 
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I. THE CONFRONTATION REQUIREMENT 
A. Ohio v. Roberts - Preliminary Hearing Testimony 
and the Reliability Test 
157 
A literal reading of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause seems 
to preclude the admission of all hearsay in criminal trials because a 
def end ant cannot confront the declarant, 20 who is functioning as a 
"witness[ ] against him .... " 21 The clause has not been interpreted 
so broadly, however. 22 Historical analysis provides a persuasive basis 
for rejecting this absolute approach. Although the rule against hear-
say evidence predates ratification of the sixth amendment, several well-
established exceptions to the general prohibition also existed at that 
time. 23 The use of some kinds of indirect evidence was therefore tacitly 
approved by the Framers, scholars and judges have concluded, reasoning 
that any major departure from evidentiary standards would have been 
expressed more explicitly. 24 Once an interpretation of the confronta-
tion clause as a blanket restriction on all indirect evidence is rejected, 
delimiting the scope of its protection is problematic. 25 The statutory 
20. "A 'declarant' is a person who makes a statement." FED. R. Ev1D. 80l(b). 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. But see Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. 
REv. 1185, 1200-02, 1206-07 (1979) (the literal reading appears impossible only because "witnesses 
against" has been incorrectly interpreted; it should be understood to include only witnesses who 
are available to appear in court and whom the prosecution can reasonably expect the defendant 
will wish to cross-examine immediately). 
22. A literal reading of confrontation would "abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, 
a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). 
23. The rule against admitting hearsay crystallized in the late 1600's or early 1700's, though 
its roots are much older. It was inspired by a desire to exclude unreliable evidence. See generally 
Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. l, 4-5 (1972); 5 J. 
WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WIGM0RE]; C. 
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 244-45 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]. Legal 
historians disagree as to how many exceptions were part of the common law when the sixth 
amendment was drafted. Compare WIGMORE § 1397 ("there was never a time when [the hear-
say rule] was without exceptions" - though none are enumerated) with F. HELLER, THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT To THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 105 n.65 (1951) (only the dying 
declaration exception was recognized at common law). 
24. See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1926) ("The right of confron-
tation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth Amendment, but was a common-law 
right having recognized exceptions. The purpose of that provision, this Court often has said, 
is to continue and preserve that right, and not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions.") See 
also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (no confrontation violation when judge and 
clerk certified the trial record to the appellate court without the accused's presence); Kirby v. 
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (dying declarations admissible); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 
U.S. 275 (1897) (deposition of dead witness admissible); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
(1895) (testimony of deceased witness from former trial admissible); Mattox v. United States, 
146 U.S. 140 (1892) (dying declarations admissible); Note, Preserving the Right to Confronta-
tion, 113 u. PA. L. REV. 741, 746-47 (1965). 
25. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-65 (1980). 
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and common law rules governing hearsay have changed since the sixth 
amendment was adopted, 26 and it is now clear that the confrontation 
guarantee is not synonomous with any particular formulation of eviden-
tiary law. 21 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's analysis of the confronta-
tion clause has been informed by the rationale underlying common 
hearsay rules - excluding unreliable evidence. 28 
Historically, the confrontation guarantee is linked with the need to prevent the government 
from conducting trials by affidavit, thereby denying defendants a reasonable opportunity to de-
f end themselves. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970). See also Read, supra 
note 23, at 5-6; Note, supra note 24, at 742-43. The popularization of this concern is often 
attributed to the abusive prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603. See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. 
at 157 n.10; Note, supra, at 746 n.31; Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay 
Rule, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 99-100 (1972) (discussing the evidence used against Raleigh and 
reproducing some of the testimony). See generally F. HELLER, supra note 23, at 104. 
26. The most prominent example, at the federal level, was the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence in 1975. See also Read, supra note 23, at 11-15. 
27. Although early cases tended to confuse or equate confrontation and hearsay, their in-
dependence is now well-established. Reluctance to equate confrontation and the hearsay rules 
is in part inspired by the widespread belief that the rules of evidence are badly in need of reform 
and that to constitutionalize them under the guise of "confrontation" would freeze a bad system 
into place. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). It is acknowledged, however, 
that confrontation and hearsay "stem from the same roots," Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 
86 (1970), and "protect similar values." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). 
28. See infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text. 
True to the common-law tradition, the process has been gradual, building on past deci-
sions, drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions. The Court 
has not sought to "map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine 
the validity of all ... hearsay 'exceptions.'" ... But a general approach to the pro-
blem is discernible. 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (citations omitted). 
Early cases focused on cross-examination. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court 
held that use of testimony from a preliminary hearing where the defendant had not been represented 
by counsel would violate the confrontation clause. It noted that the right to confront includes 
the right to cross-examine, and that confrontation is applicable to the states through the four-
. teenth amendment's due process clause. The Court placed similar emphasis on cross-examination 
as a vital component of confrontation in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). There, the 
prosecutor put an accomplice on the stand and read aloud his confession inculpating the defen-
dant, purportedly to refresh the accomplice's memory. The defendant's rights had been violated, 
the Court held, because the witness's memory lapse precluded cross-examination. Again in Barber 
v. Page, 390 U.S: 719 (1968), the Court described confrontation as a trial right and noted that 
a past opportunity to cross-examine a witness - i.e., at a preliminary hearing - would not 
satisfy the constitutional requirement. That decision, however, turned on the fact that the pro-
secution had been lax in its efforts to secure the witness's presence at trial; thus, the cross-
examination language is essentially dictum. 
The Court began to back away from the absolute stance of Pointer in California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149 (1970), in which it allowed the admission of cross-examined preliminary hearing 
testimony when the witness professed a memory lapse at trial. A year later, in Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74 (1970), hearsay was permitted where there had been no prior opportunity for cross-
examination. In Dutton a witness recounted the statement of the defendant's co-conspirator, 
a former cell-mate. The Court denied a writ for habeas corpus, noting that the defendant had 
been able to cross-examine twenty prosecution witnesses, although not the co-conspirator. The 
Court concluded that error, "if ... [it] exists, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Id. at 93. 
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In Ohio v. Roberts, 29 the Supreme Court's most recent exploration 
of the parameters of confrontation, the defendant challenged the state's 
use of preliminary hearing testimony that had been properly admitted 
under the Ohio rules of evidence governing unavailable witnesses. 30 
Herschel Roberts had been convicted for receiving stolen property. His 
defense - that he was given the checks and credit cards by their owners' 
daughter with the understanding that he could use them - was rebutted 
by the prosecution's introduction of the daughter's testimony from the 
preliminary hearing. 31 Roberts's appointed counsel had called the 
daughter as his only witness at the hearing and questioned her "at 
some length. " 32 Although she testified that she knew Roberts and had 
let him stay at her apartment while she was away, she denied having 
given him the checks and cards or permission to use them. By the time 
of trial, the daughter could not be located. The preliminary hearing 
transcript was admitted over the objections of Roberts's counsel. 33 
In assessing Roberts's claim, the Court acknowledged that confronta-
tion is an ill-defined concept. 34 It considered both the policies underlying 
the confrontation clause and competing societal interests. 35 On the one 
hand, the confrontation clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face 
confrontation at trial" and facilitates cross-examination. 36 Allowing 
the fact-finder to observe the demeanor of the witness, thereby assess-
ing credibility, promotes accuracy. 37 The Court also recognized, 
however, that "every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law 
enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the 
rules of evidence ... in criminal proceedings. " 38 These latter interests, 
on occasion, "may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial. " 39 
The Court reconciled these competing concerns with a two-step ap-
proach. As a threshold requirement, the Court held that the confron-
tation clause imposes a "rule of necessity": the prosecution must 
produce its witnesses or demonstrate their unavailability. 40 This initial 
29. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
30. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (Page 1975). Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59. 
31. The preliminary hearing was followed by a county grand jury indictment for forgery, 
receiving stolen property, and possession of heroin. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 59-60. 
34. Id. at 62-65. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 63. 
37. Id. at 63-64. 
38. Id. at 64. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 65. A qualification of this "rule" diminishes its significance. A !lemonstration 
of unavailability is not required where "the utility of trial confrontation [is] so remote" that 
a court finds it pointless to "require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness." 
Id. at 65 n.7. 
There are two possible explanations for this exception to the Roberts test. First, it may be 
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requirement operates as a safeguard against the possibility of an abusive 
"trial by affidavit. " 41 Once a witness is deemed "unavailable," the 
Court's second element comes into play. To be admissible, a state-
ment made by an unavailable witness must bear "adequate 'indicia 
of reliability.' " 42 Traditional hearsay rules are the touchstone for this 
reliability inquiry. When challenged evidence falls within a "firmly 
rooted" hearsay exception, reliability is simply inferred. 43 Other types 
of evidence, however, must evince "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness"44 or be excluded. 45 
Applying this test to the facts of Roberts, the Court held that the 
daughter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible. The threshold 
requirement of the witness's unavailability at trial was satisfied by the 
prosecution's good faith efforts. 46 The Court therefore concentrated 
on the reliability of the testimony, focusing on the characteristics of 
the hearing. 47 The crucial factor in its finding that adequate "indicia 
of reliability" existed was vigorous questioning by the defense attorney. 
understood as an effort to reconcile Roberts with the holding in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 
74 (1970), where there was no discussion of why the declarant did not appear in person even 
though, as a prisoner, he was presumably "available" to the prosecution. The defendant in that 
case was clearly unwilling to concede the uselessness of trial confrontation. See also United States 
v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1981) ("necessity" is not an absolute requirement under 
Roberts). 
Second, a number of writers have expressed concern that an iron-clad rule of necessity would 
call into question well-established and non-controversial hearsay exceptions and needlessly over-
burden courts with unwieldly evidence. Compare California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172-89 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring), and Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 
1439 (1966) (confrontation requires only a good faith effort by the prosecution to produce all 
witnesses at trial), with Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93-100 (Harlan, J., concurring) (repudiating 
his position in Green because requiring the production of available witnesses would curtail the 
development of the law of evidence). See also Westen, supra note 21 (confrontation requires 
the production of only those available witnesses whom the prosecution can reasonably expect 
the defendant will wish to cross-examine immediately); Read, supra note 23, (advocating a case-
by-case examination of hearsay exceptions for compliance with the underlying values of confron-
tation); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 194-96, (1971) (cases seem to 
focus on prosecution's conduct and not the nature of hearsay) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme 
Court]. 
Although a loose interpretation of this qualification to the "necessity" prong of the Roberts 
test threatens to render the confrontation guarantee meaningless, if conscientiously circumscribed 
it provides a reasonable accommodation by permitting the use of well-established and non-
controversial hearsay exceptions. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(6), (8) (business records, public 
reports). 
Disagreement over whether the state had met its burden of proof on "necessity" prompted 
the dissent in Roberts. 448 U.S. at 77-82. 
41. See supra note 25. 
42. Id. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)). 
43. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
44. But see infra note 117. 
45. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
46. Id. at 74-77. But see supra note 40. 
47. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-73. 
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While the daughter technically testified on direct examination, 48 the 
Court emphasized that the exchange amounted to "the equivalent of 
significant cross-examination. " 49 Counsel repeatedly used leading ques-
tions, formally the distinguishing characteristic of cross-examination. so 
More importantly, the Court found that the purpose of the question-
ing was identical to that behind cross-examination. s I Defense counsel 
probed the witness's sincerity, perception, memory, and ability to 
communicate. 52 Relying on the "guarantees of trustworthiness in the 
accouterments [sic] of the preliminary hearing itself," the Court held 
that the daughter's testimony satisfied the confrontation clause, 53 refus-
ing to distinguish Roberts from an earlier case54 involving cross-examined 
preliminary hearing testimony. 
B. Roberts Reliability Test and Grand Jury Testimony 
In Roberts the Supreme Court addressed the effect of the confronta-
tion guarantee on the use of preliminary hearing testimony. Its two-
step analysis applies more generally, ss however, and provides the 
framework for evaluating the use of grand jury testimony as well. 56 
48. After the prosecution had called several witnesses, Roberts's lawyer called the complain-
ant's daughter, whom he had seen in the courthouse hallway. He questioned her at length and 
attempted to elicit an admission that she had led the defendant to believe she had permission 
to use her parents' checks and credit cards. She denied the suggestion, and the attorney never 
asked to have her declared hostile or placed on cross-examination. The prosecutor did not ex-
amine the witness. Technically, therefore, the defense questioning took place on direct examina-
tion. Yet' as a matter of form and purpose, it resembled cross-examination; neither the pro-
secutor nor the judge protested and the scope of the exchange was not limited. Id. at 58, 70-71. 
49. Id. at 70. 
50. Id. at 70-71. See FED. R. Evm. 611(c) ("Leading questions should not be used on direct 
examination ... [but] should be permitted on cross-examination."). 
51. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71. The Court apparently failed to consider that the purposes of 
a preliminary hearing and a trial differ in that the former is concerned with probable cause 
and the latter with guilt or innocence. The extent and scope of defense cross-examination at 
the hearing stage is, therefore, not likely to be the same as at trial, regardless of formal limita-
tions. Defense questioning at a hearing can be affected by the defendant's interests both in ex-
ploring the strength of the prosecution's case and protecting the details of its own. Lack of 
preparation (especially when, as in Roberts, the defendant's counsel is appointed) and the understan-
dable expectation of another opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial - despite local 
rules about the admissibility of prior testimony - may also restrict cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 73. 
54. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
55. See, e.g., Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982) (unsworn statement to police); 
Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981) (extrajudicial statements of murder victim and 
her mother); Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1981) (accomplice's unsworn statements 
to police and prior trial testimony); United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(extrajudicial declaration of alleged co-conspirator). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mur-
162 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:1 
Once a grand jury witness is deemed ''unavailable,'' the reliability in-
quiry determines whether admission of the grand jury transcript is 
constitutional. 57 Because grand jury testimony does not fall within a 
well-established exception to the hearsay rule58 - which would trigger 
an inference of reliability under Roberts - it must be scrutinized to 
determine whether it possesses adequate ''indicia of reliability.'' 59 
Although the minimum threshold of reliability for confrontation pur-
poses is an open question, the Supreme Court has determined that the 
characteristics of preliminary hearings are sufficient guarantees. 60 
Therefore, a comparison of the "accoutrements" of the grand jury 
setting and preliminary hearings provides insight into the reliability of 
grand jury transcripts for later use at trial. 
1. Similarities- Grand jury testimony does share certain attributes 
with preliminary hearing testimony that contribute to reliability. 61 Like 
phy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
57. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. 
58. For example, grand jury testimony does not qualify under the federal rules as a "former 
testimony" exception to the hearsay rule. 
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, 
or in a deposition . . . [is not excluded as hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as 
a witness] if the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had an oppor-
tunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(l) (emphasis added). FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(5), the residual exception, is 
"of recent origin." United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, n.8 (6th Cir. 1982). 
59. 448 U.S. at 66. 
60. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The Roberts Court, 
however, specifically reserved the question whether testimony from a preliminary hearing 
characterized by little or no defense questioning would violate the confrontation clause. Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 70. 
61. Reflecting this fact, grand jury testimony is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt 
- not merely as a means of refreshing memory or impeachment - when the witness is present 
at trial and subject to cross-examination. See FED. R. Evrn. 80l(d)(l), providing, inter alia, that 
[a] statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and 
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) in-
consistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of per-
jury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (8) consistent with 
his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive. . . . (Emphasis added). 
See also United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Woods, 
613 F.2d 629, 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980); United States v. Mosley, 555 
F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1978); United States v. Morgan, 555 
F.2d 238, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976); United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 932-34 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964). Cf. United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 451-52 (4th Cir.) 
("an oath or possible cross-examination provide [sic] sufficient assurances of reliability that the 
statement ought to be admitted as substantive evidence of the facts it contains."), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 876 (1974); United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971) (grand jury testimony 
held inadmissible under both hearsay rules and confrontation clause when the declarant, although 
physically present, refused to be sworn and so was not subject to cross-examination), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 984 (1973). 
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preliminary hearing testimony, grand jury testimony is elicited under 
oath in surroundings likely to impress the witness with the solemnity 
of the proceedings, and the sanction of perjury looms for false state-
ments. 62 In both proceedings, the witness's account is given at a point 
which is closer in time to the events described than is the trial, minimiz-
ing the chances of forgetfulness or embellishment. 63 In addition, the 
contemporaneous creation of a verbatim transcript in each setting con-
tributes to reliability because it ensures that the record of the proceedings 
will be accurate and complete. 64 
2. Differences- Despite these similarities, significant differences 
between preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings exist which 
compromise the reliability of grand jury testimony for use at a later 
trial when the witness is unavailable. 
a. The absence of defense counsel- Preliminary hearings are like 
trials in that the defendant, counsel, and judge are all present. 65 Grand 
juries, on the other hand, are not traditional adversary proceedings: 
they are one-man shows orchestrated by the prosecutor, with defense 
counsel generally restricted to the anteroom. 66 This difference affects 
the reliability of the resulting testimony in several ways. First, the pro-
secutor calls and examines all grand jury witnesses, 67 without oppos-
ing counsel to monitor the questioning and to object when appropriate. 
The· lack of this usual adversarial balance creates the potential for 
62. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). 
63. Cf United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (grand jury testimony properly 
admitted under judge's discretion pursuant to FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(l) where there was a year 
and a half delay before trial). But see R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To 
EVIDENCE 474 n.66 (2d ed. 1982) ("Studies indicate that most forgetting occurs within a few 
days after an event. Thus an individual who testifies at a hearing three months after an event 
is likely to remember very little more about the event than an individual who testifies a year later."). 
64. In 1979, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) was amended to require that all grand jury proceedings, 
except the jurors' deliberation and voting, be recorded. Many states transcnbe grand jury testimony 
as well. See supra note 3. 
65. The defendant's right to be present at trial is considered a component of the confronta-
tion right. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS. supra note 2, at 30; Read, supra note 23, 
at 49; Westen, Confrontation & Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567 
(1978). The right may be forfeited, however, and a defendant excluded from the courtroom, 
for continued "disruptive behavior" after a warning. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
66. Generally, the only parties in the grand jury room are the jurors, the prosecutor, the 
witness, and a stenographer. The federal rules do not allow witnesses to have counsel present, 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), though about a dozen states permit putative defendants to bring their 
lawyers into the chamber. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS. supra note 2, at 24, 59-69. Witnesses 
are permitted to interrupt their testimony to confer with counsel. Id. at 62-69. Even the few 
jurisdictions which permit putative defendants to have counsel within the grand jury room restrict 
their role to advising the witness, not questioning. See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. supra 
note l, at 782. Future defendants cannot always be identified at the grand jury stage, however, 
and they have no right, in any case, to attend grand jury proceedings. See infra notes 77-81 
and accompanying text (grand jury secrecy). 
67. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, at 30. 
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abuse. 68 As a trained advocate, the prosecutor may intimidate witnesses 
or ask misleading questions. 69 
Second, and more important, the absence of defense counsel precludes 
the opportunity for cross-examination of grand jury witnesses. Although 
cross-examination is not an absolute constitutional requirement under 
the confrontation clause, 70 it is the primary mechanism for ensuring 
"substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation 
requirement." 11 Cross-examination promotes reliability by providing 
an opportunity to test the accuracy of direct testimony12 and by render-
ing the testimony more complete. 73 Because the grand jury setting, unlike 
68. This "inquisitorial" procedure represents a relatively rare exception to the adversary method 
that is fundamental to the American judicial system. 
Inquisitorial systems view the criminal process as an official inquiry where state of-
ficials take primary responsibility for determining whether the defendant has commit-
ted a crime ... [S]tate officials direct the official investigation, determine the appropriate 
charges, and conduct the course of a nonadversarial trial that offers a public recapitula-
tion of the official investigation. 
In contrast: 
[o]ur accusatorial system structures criminal proceedings not as an official inquiry but 
as a dispute between two parties, the state and the accused ... [l]t encompasses not 
only adversarial trial procedure but other fundamental norms taken from constitutional 
law that regulate the balance of advantage between the state and the accused throughout 
the criminal process. 
Arenella, supra note 2, at 465 nn.4-5. 
Ex parte proceedings are used in some other contexts. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 
436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search warrant for newspaper offices); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 
307 (1967) (injunction prohibiting a demonstration). 
69. The pro-government bias is inherent in grand jury proceedings, despite the "presumption 
of fair and orderly conduct by ... state officials." In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 334 (1957). 
American Bar Association standards require that the prosecutor, as legal advisor to the grand 
jury, "give due deference to its status as an independent lega~ body" and "not make statements 
or arguments in an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner which would be impermissi-
ble at trial before a petit jury." PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.5 (1978). Yet even 
if the prosecutor complies with these standards, the grand jury receives a skewed perception 
of the evidence because the prosecutor's goal is to establish probable cause or a prima facie 
case, not to convey the full story. See infra note 75. 
70. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (direct examination may serve as the 
equivalent of cross-examination); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (use of absent co-
conspirator's statement does not violate the confrontation clause). See also Baker, The Right 
to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rule, and Due Process - A Proposal for Determining When 
Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974) (no absolute right to 
cross-examination if policies are otherwise protected). 
71. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166. See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
295 (1973); W1GMORE, supra note 23, § 1367 ("[C]ross-examination is beyond any doubt the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."). 
72. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64. 
73. It is impossible to assess the utility of cross-examination that never occurred. United 
States v. Murphy provides an interesting illustration. The witness's grand jury testimony was 
admitted in two separate trials of the same defendants for different bank robberies. At the first 
trial, the witness also testified in person, on cross-examination, that he had named the defen- · 
dants only after suggestions by an FBI agent; his refusal to be sworn at the second trial kept 
that information from the jury. 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 709 (1974): 
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a preliminary hearing, excludes precisely those parties - the defend-
ant and his lawyer - who would be most motivated to probe the 
weaknesses of a witness's account, point out gaps, and seize on facts 
that fail to support the government's charges, 74 testimony elicited before 
the grand jury may be neither accurate nor complete. 75 When a witness 
is unavailable to testify at trial, the defendant is denied the opportuni-
ty to "cure" this deprivation of contemporaneous cross-examination. 76 
As a result, the reliability of grand jury testimony is fatally compromised 
for confrontation purposes. 
b. Secrecy- Preliminary hearings are held in open court. 77 This 
exposure to public view makes witnesses accountable for their state-
ments, thereby encouraging true and complete testimony. 78 Grand jury 
proceedings, on the other hand, are closed to everyone except the pro-
secutor, jurors, the witness, and a stenographer. 79 This system's secrecy 
provides little incentive for rigorous and complete truth-telling, for it 
conveys the impression to witnesses that they will be able to avoid 
unpleasant grilling by defense counsel and that their testimony will never 
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and 
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgment were to 
be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of 
the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of 
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. 
74. This exclusion is arguably justified at the grand jury, where the issue is whether there 
is enough evidence to go to trial; its importation into the trial itself, where the issue is guilt 
or innocence, raises a more serious challenge to the adversary model. See supra note 68. In 
some jurisdictions, prosecutors are under a duty to present exculpatory evidence. M. FRANKEL 
& G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, at 30-31, 70-72. 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628 (10th Cir. 1979) (usefulness of 
cross-examination for clarifying damaging yet ambiguous grand jury testimony), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 840 (1980). 
Indirect support for the proposition that the absence of defense counsel substantively affects 
grand jury evidence can be found in statistics: grand juries refuse to issue indictments in only 
about three to eight per cent of the cases presented to them. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 
I, at 22. See also Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, lO OR. L. REV. 101 (1931). But 
see Dession, From Indictment to Information - Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163, 
178-79 (1932) (the grand jury's high rate of concurrence with the prosecutor demonstrates ex-
cellent pre-screening). A third possibility is that the burden of showing probable cause or a prima 
facie case, as opposed to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is so low that the rate of indictment 
is naturally high. 
76. See supra note 61. 
77. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. But see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) 
(despite a "strong societal interest in public trials," the sixth amendment does not bar closure 
of a pretrial proceeding to protect defendants' rights to a fair trial where the accused, the pro-
secutor, and the judge agree). Cf. Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 
399 N.E.2d 518 (1979) (distinguishing various types of pretrial proceedings for closure purposes). 
78. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (historical distrust of secret proceedings). Compare 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (general rule of secrecy for federal grand juries) with FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 26 (general rule that trial testimony shall be taken orally in open court). 
79. See supra note 66. 
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be revealed to anyone outside the government. 80 The reliability of grand 
jury testimony suffers as a result of this enhanced opportunity for ex-
aggerations and omissions. 81 These defects may be as damning to the 
defendant as outright lies, yet harder to detect and to rebut with a cold 
record. 
c. Evidentiary standards- Differences in evidentiary standards at 
preliminary hearings and before grand juries also render testimony from 
the latter proceeding suspect for use at trial. First, while preliminary 
hearings usually follow tric!,l rules on the admissibility of evidence, 82 
grand jury indictments may be based entirely on hearsay. 83 As a result, 
a grand jury transcript used at trial could be double hearsay and its 
80. See supra note 3. Under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3) (1970), and FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 26.2, federal defendants cannot discover the grand jury testimony of a prosecution 
witness for possible use in impeaching the witness until the time of trial. When a witness will 
not be available at trial, however, FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(5) requires pretrial disclosure as a precon-
dition for government use of the testimony: 
[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide 
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer 
the statement and the particulars of it . . . 
But see United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d I 141 (4th Cir.) (allowing use of grand jury testimony 
at trial without prior notice when the witness's refusal to testify was unexpected), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 936 (1978). 
State procedures on disclosure vary; many formerly required a stringent showing for discovery, 
but most provisions today treat grand jury testimony like other recorded statements given by 
a witness. See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at ll67. 
81. The Supreme Court has articulated five reasons for the grand jury secrecy rule: 
(!) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to 
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons 
subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent 
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand 
jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and 
untrammeled disclosure by persons who have information with respect to the commis-
sion of crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure 
of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing 
trial where there was no probability of guilt. 
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States 
v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)). See also M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 
2, at 23 ("Secrecy is a dark notion with Americans ... [b]ut the secrecy of the grand jury 
is basically a good idea, as abused and perverted as it often is."). 
82. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978) 
(procedural advantages for defendants at hearings contrasted with grand juries). But see FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 5.l(a) (finding of probable cause at the preliminary examination may be based en-
tirely on hearsay). 
83. The rules applicable to grand juries vary among jurisdictions. See, e.g., Costello v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (federal indictment based entirely on hearsay). Cf United States 
v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1260 (3d Cir. 1979) (indictment to be dismissed if 1) non-hearsay 
evidence was readily available, 2) the jurors were misled to believe they were hearing testimony 
from personal knowledge, and 3) there is a high probability the jurors would not have voted 
for indictment had they heard the eyewitness); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 
1972) (indictment dismissed based on government's needless use of hearsay); United States v. 
Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968) (unjustified use of hearsay before grand jury disapproved). 
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reliability consequently diminished. 84 In addition, prosecutors may ask 
leading questions before a grand jury, a technique which helps to. mold 
a witness's answers along lines desired by the questioner. 85 The resulting 
testimony will inevitably bear the traces of this pro-government bias, 
more or less overtly, and its reliability for trial use is dubious. 
The similarities between grand jury proceedings and preliminary hear-
ings - oath requirements, formal surroundings, and the contempora-
neous creation of a verbatim transcript - encourage reliable testimony, 
but they constitute only meager guarantees, especially when witnesses 
have personal interests at stake. 86 The factor most critical to safeguard 
reliability is the opportunity for cross-examination. Oath requirements 
may deter a witness from being less than candid on the stand, but 
only the presence of defense counsel and the opportunity for cross-
examination can ensure that questionable testimony will be examined 
and exposed. 87 Prosecutors cannot be expected to perform zealously 
the defense counsel's function. 88 When a defense lawyer elects not to 
pursue cross-examination at a preliminary hearing or a trial for tac-
tical reasons, a professional strategy judgment has been made based 
on the total circumstances surrounding a case: either the testimony does 
not appear very damaging, or there are other ways to attack it, or 
the potential for harm exceeds the likelihood of eliciting useful 
information. 89 But in the grand jury setting, where all opportunity for 
84. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 23, § 310; R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, supra 
note 63, at 370. 
If a witness's statements before the grand jury are hearsay and the transcript of that pro-
ceeding is admitted at trial, the trier of fact is twice removed from the declarant and ill-equipped 
to judge credibility. Double hearsay is admissible only when each level satisfies some exception 
to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., FED. R. Evrn. 805. 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (leading ques-
tions can distort testimony). See also McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart 
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Cf. FED. R. Evm. 6ll(c) advisory com-
mittee note ("The rule continues the traditional view that the suggestive powers of the leading 
question are as a general proposition undesirable."). 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 
57 (1982); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 U.S. 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States 
v. McKethan, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
87. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1964) (admitting prior testimony at trial held to violate the confrontation clause when the lack 
of appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing precluded effective cross-examination). 
88. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
89. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 1371. 
Inferring this rational weighing of the utility of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing 
seems somewhat unrealistic, however, even if defense counsel is charged with the knowledge 
that the testimony may be admissible at a later trial. Given time pressures, counsel is likely to 
be less well prepared at the preliminary hearing stage and so less able to cross-examine mean-
ingfully. Even if counsel is adequately prepared, discovery and plea-bargaining concerns may 
influence the choice whether to cross-examine or not at a pretrial hearing. See infra note 98. 
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cross-examination is denied, no similar inference of a calculated choice 
by the defense mitigates the testimony's possible unreliability. 90 
The secrecy91 of grand jury proceedings and the added flexibility 
of evidentiary rules92 might not, by themselves, fatally compromise the 
reliability of grand jury testimony if the opportunity existed for con-
temporaneous cross-examination. Although secrecy and flexible rules 
increase the possibility of unreliable testimony, 93 the effectiveness of 
cross-examination as a tool for highlighting inaccuracy and incomplete-
ness would offset these other defects. 94 
Thus, the overriding importance of the opportunity for cross-
examination as a guarantor of reliable testimony outweighs the few 
"indicia of reliability" that grand jury and preliminary hearing pro-
ceedings share. 95 Although the Roberts Court adopted a flexible and 
pragmatic approach for assessing reliability, 96 vigorous defense counsel 
participation at the preliminary hearing was the key to its decision. 97 
Such participation is impossible before the grand jury, and when a 
grand jury witness is subsequently unavailable at trial, defense counsel 
cannot supplement the deficient record with live testimony. The ad-
mission of such evidence cannot be justified under the Roberts con-
frontation test. 98 
90. The line drawn by courts has been whether there was an opportunity for cross-examination, 
not whether cross-examination was full and effective rather than de minimus. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Zurosky, 614 
F.2d 779, 793 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980); United States v. Amaya, 533 
F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977). Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 70, 73 n.12 (1980) (reserving the question whether de minimus questioning is sufficient to 
satisfy confrontation and rejecting an "effectiveness" inquiry except in unusual circumstances); 
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1972) (exploring the adequacy of cross-examination). 
Relying on the opportunity for cross-examination and not the effective exercise of that right 
accords with judicial reluctance to examine the competence of counsel. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, ll7-18 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, defendants are generally bound 
by their lawyers' choices, even if they subsequently change attorneys. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 72; Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899 
(1981); Amaya, 553 F.2d at 191-92. 
91. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra note 71. 
95. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964) 
(preliminary hearing testimony held inadmissible when absence of counsel precluded effective 
cross-examination). 
96. See supra notes 34-54 and accompanying text. 
97. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-73. 
98. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. The striking difference in the degree of 
defense counsel participation at preliminary hearings and grand juries is difficult to justify in 
functional terms, because both proceedings serve to screen prosecutions. They are clearly not 
perfect equivalents - for example, grand juries are important investigative tools and preliminary 
hearings facilitate discovery - yet their functional similarity is substantial. See also supra note 89. 
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II. BEYOND ROBERTS 
The Roberts confrontation analysis cannot always determine the ad-
missibility of grand jury testimony when a witness is unavailable at 
trial. In United States v. Thevis, 99 for example, the court found that 
the defendant had waived his confrontation rights by murdering a grand 
jury witness in order to prevent his testimony at trial. The deceased 
man's testimony was therefore admitted. 100 Similarly, the defendant's 
waiver mooted confrontation analysis in United States v. Balano, 101 
where the grand jury witness was frightened into silence by threats and 
phone calls. A finding that confrontation has been waived, 102 however, 
99. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3489 (1982). 
100. Id. at 630-31. 
101. 618 F.2d 624, 628-30 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). 
102. The frequency with which defendants are found to have waived confrontation rights 
suggests some judicial impatience with the exclusion of relatively reliable grand jury testimony. 
Although it is clear that constitutional rights may be waived, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. I 
(1966), an "intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege" is required, Johnson·-v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This standard encompasses implied as well as explicit waivers, but 
there is always a presumption against waiver. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Snyder 
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Settings in which confrontation waiver has been found 
effective include guilty pleas, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); FED. R. CRIM. 
P. ll(c)(3) & (4), and repeated disruptive behavior by the defendant, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 
337 (1970). 
Confrontation waivers as prerequisites for the admission of grand jury testimony of unavailable 
witnesses have all been implied, based on evidence (or suspicion) that the defendant was respon-
sible for the unavailability. Defendants have been deemed to "waive" the right either when they 
have intimidated a witness who has become too fearful to testify, United States v. Carlson, 547 
F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), or when they have caused the witness's 
death, United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982). 
The waiver determination is usually made at an evidentiary hearing and the standard of proof 
varies. Compare Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630-31 ("clear and convincing"), with United States v. 
Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) ("preponderance of the evidence"), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 840 (1980). The underlying premise of these cases is the equitable principle that a 
wrongdoer should not profit from his misdeeds. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); 
F. HELLER, supra note 23, at 105-06. 
Even where holdings have not turned on a finding of confrontation waiver, discussion of the 
defendant's responsibility for a witness's unavailability often arises and seems to influence out-
comes. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982) ("strong indication" 
but no proof of defendants' pressure; testimony admitted); Tolbert v. Jago, 607 F.2d 753 (6th 
Cir.) (grand jury testimony held admissible where the shooting of a key prosecution witness strongly 
suggested his purported loss of memory at trial was due to threats), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022 
(1979); United States v. West, 574 F.2d I 131 (4th Cir. 1978) (deceased witness's grand jury testimony 
held admissible in a drug prosecution where circumstances suggested a "contract" killing and 
the testimony was corroborated); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.) (grand jury 
testimony found admissible because of substantial guarantees of trustworthiness; reliance on threats 
to find waiver would be "speculative"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Gon-
zalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (grand jury testimony found inadmissible where there was 
no claim by the unavailable witness that the defendant threatened him); United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (no need to prove waiver by clear and convinc-
ing evidence where the government adequately demonstrated its particularized guarantees of 
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does not automatically mean that grand jury testimony is admissible. 
The due process clause103 imposes an independent check on the use 
of all evidence at a criminal trial, 1 04 including grand jury testimony. 
This section focuses on what the nature and extent of this due process 
scrutiny should be. 
Fairness is the fundamental concern of the due process clause. 105 
Those accused of a crime are assured a reasonable opportunity to def end 
themselves. 106 In the context of evidentiary rules, for example, due pro-
cess bars the use of evidence which is so unreliable that it fails to "afford 
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating its truth." 107 Due 
process also requires that convictions be based only on evidence that, 
in the aggregate, establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 108 
Although the Supreme Court has never applied a due process analysis 
to the problems posed by grand jury testimony when the witness is 
unavailable, 109 it has held that the appropriate approach to due pro-
cess analysis in analogous areas requires an examination of the "totality 
of the circumstances." 110 
trustworthiness). Cf. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1200-04 (6th Cir. 1982) (unavailable co-
conspirator's prior unsworn statement properly admitted where the defendants caused the 
unavailability through threats; court "must consider how far the standard of reliability and trust-
worthiness should be relaxed when the defendants are at fault"); United States v. Peacock, 654 
F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981) (declarations of dead co-conspirators and murder victim admissible 
under the "lenient" Roberts standard). See generally Graham, supra note 25, at 140-43. 
103. See supra note I 5. 
104. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also 
Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1971); 
Westen, supra note 21; Note, supra note 40. 
105. "[I]nflexible rules of exclusion [of evidence] that may frustrate rather than promote 
justice have not been viewed recently by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm .... The stan-
dard, after all, is that of fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977) (citations omitted) (suspect identification 
held admissible). 
106. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a 
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against 
the State's accusations .... ") 
107. Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
163-64 n.15 (1970); Westen, supra note 65, at 598. 
108. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("In the administration of criminal justice, 
courts must carefully guard against the dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established 
by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
109. See supra notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text. 
110. See, e.g., Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (suspect 
identification cases). See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976) ("totality" ap-
proach to claim that jury trial in prison clothes violated due process); Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973) (evidentiary rulings deprived the defendant of a fair trial based on 
the "facts and circumstances" of this case); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (dic-
tum) (pretrial police investigations are subject to due process scrutiny of "particularized cir-
cumstances"); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-42 (1966) (voluntariness of pre-Miranda 
confession assessed in light of the entire record). 
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By its very nature, the "totality of the circumstances" approach can-
not be reduced to a neat formula yielding predictable results. A court's 
determination on admissibility must be informed by "reason, princi-
ple, and common human experience." 111 A careful examination of the 
reliability of evidence is necessary even when the defendant is held to 
have waived his constitutional right under the confrontation clause. 
For although the defendant's decision to intimidate or even murder 
the witness suggests that the defendant believed the witness's trial 
testimony would have been damning and difficult to refute - and 
therefore is a factor to be considered - the act of waiver is not 
dispositive of the reliability of the unavailable witness's testimony. 
Waiver bears no logical relationship to the accuracy and completeness 
of the testimony elicited before the grand jury. 112 The defendant's right 
to a fair trial under the due process clause, as well as society's institu-
tional concern with fair and accurate criminal adjudications, 113 requires 
a detailed inquiry into the probative value of the proffered grand jury 
testimony .114 The court's task is not to render a definitive pronounce-
ment on the reliability of the grand jury testimony, but rather to deter-
mine whether it bears sufficient "indicia of reliability" for consideration 
by a properly instructed jury. 115 Thus the threshold for admissibility 
is comparatively low. 116 
The scope of the due process inquiry into reliability is significantly 
broader than the Roberts confrontation analysis. 111 For confrontation 
Ill. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976). 
112. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); United 
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982). See also infra 
note 114. 
113. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[T]he two-fold aim [of criminal justice] 
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."). 
114. See supra note 110. See also Baker, supra note 70, at 549-55; Davenport, The Confron-
tation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1378, 1390 (1972); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful 
Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV. 151, 195-98 (1978). 
115. "We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for 
evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are 
not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony 
that has some questionable feature." Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977). The Court 
has concluded that, within limits, jury instructions are a dependable safeguard. But see infra 
note 137. 
116. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (exclusion required only if there 
is a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification"); United States v. Bernett, 495 
F.2d 943, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Trustworthiness is not a constitutional question at all; it is 
the classical question for the jury, under adequate instructions of course, unless the evidence 
is so blatantly unreliable that it should be excluded on the grounds of competence or prejudice."); 
Westen, supra note 21, at 1190, 1199. The check always remains that, in the aggregate, evidence 
must support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt to comport with due process. See supra 
note 108. 
117. There is some ambiguity in the Roberts opinion as to the proper scope of the reliability 
inquiry. Initially, Justice Blackmun argued that if evidence does not fall within a "firmly rooted 
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purposes, traditional hearsay rules guide the assessment of reliability. 118 
The investigation is circumscribed, comporting with the practical need 
for precise and workable rules of evidence in criminal trials. 119 In 
Roberts, for example, the Court explicitly declined to consider the 
parties' relationships or the inherent plausibility of the particular 
testimony at issue; it looked instead to the "accouterments [sic] of the 
preliminary hearing itself." 120 This categoric approach provides trial 
judges with a rule of thumb. Due process, on the other hand, requires 
a full exploration of surrounding circumstances121 when a defendant 
is found to have waived the right to confront a grand jury witness. 122 
It is of course impossible to com.pile an exhaustive list of factors a 
court should consider under the due process approach. In every case, 
however, the witness, the nature. of the testimony, corroboration, and 
subsequent events are significant areas of concern. 
hearsay exception," it "must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted). His opinion proceeds to discuss 
the reliability of the preliminary hearing testimony at issue, comparing it with California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149 (1970), and focusing on the existence of vigorous defense questioning. This analysis 
seems to be an acknowledgment that this case, involving uncross-examined preliminary hearing 
testimony, is not governed by a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." See supra note 58. Later 
in the opinion, however, Justice Blackmun wrote: "[W]e reject [Roberts's] attempt to fall back 
on generalized principles of confrontation, and his argument that this case falls among those 
in which the Court must undertake a particularized search for 'indicia of reliability'." Rather, 
the proper approach was to focus on the "guarantees of trustworthiness in ~he accouterments 
[sic] of the preliminary hearing itself," not on the "inherent reliability or unreliability" of the 
unavailable witness and her story. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73. Applying the Court's analysis 
to the admissibility of grand jury testimony, the correct method for assessing compliance with 
confrontation seems to be an examination of its "accoutrements," i.e., a categoric approach. 
Lower courts, however, have focused on Roberts' "particularized guarantees" language and, 
after considering a broad range of factors, have often found grand jury testimony sufficiently 
reliable to meet the confrontation test in a particular case. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 
693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The problem with this interpretation of the 
Roberts test is that it renders the second step-reliability analysis-virtually indistinguishable 
from due process scrutiny. See supra note 110. A number of authors have, in fact, argued that 
confrontation encompasses only the first prong of the Roberts test-necessity-and that reliability 
is properly understood as a due process concern. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
172-89 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Westen, supra note 21; Note, supra note 40. Although 
this approach is conceptually sound, it has been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court. Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 66-68 n.9. 
118. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
119. Id. at 64. 
120. Id. at 73. See also supra note 117. 
121. See supra note 110. 
122. This examination need not unduly burden the administration of justice. A due process 
hearing can often be combined with a hearing to determine whether confrontation has been waived. 
See supra note 102. See also Baker, supra note 70, at 549-55 (advocating a short due process 
hearing, with the burden of proof on the defendant if the hearsay falls within an exception). 
But see Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Searr:h of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. 
L. REV. 43, 58-59 (1975) (arguing that due process hearings are an unworkable solution). 
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A. The Witness 
The trier of fact must evaluate a declarant's credibility whether or 
not he ever appears as a witness at trial. 123 When the witness is 
unavailable, there are simply fewer tools for performing the job. 124 
Indirect indicators of credibility can satisfy the requirements of due 
process, however. Many judgments about the various elements of witness 
credibility - sincerity, perception, memory, and ability to commun-
icate125 - can be formulated on the basis of information available to 
a judge at a due process hearing on admissibility. 126 If circumstances 
suggest that the grand jury testimony is false or that the trier of fact 
will have no effective means of assessing the witness's credibility, it 
should be excluded. If an examination reveals that the testimony is 
merely questionable, it should be admitted for consideration by the 
trier of fact along with the rest of the evidence, and weighted 
appropriately. 121 
The relationship of the unavailable witness to the defendant and to 
the alleged crime is a key element under a due process ''totality of 
the circumstances" approach because it can influence the assessment 
of the witness's credibility. For example, a grand jury witness without 
personal ties to the defendant and who is not under investigation for 
a crime is more likely to testify accurately than a witness who is im-
plicated in the crime or connected with the defendant. 128 In United 
States v. Mastrangelo, 129 the grand jury testimony of an unavailable 
witness was needed to identify the defendant as the purchaser of four 
123. See Westen, supra note 65, at 598-99 (no absolute correlation exists between direct or 
indirect testimony and reliability; both should be evaluated under a single test). Considerations 
include consistency with other information in the case, internal consistency, and conformance 
with the trier of fact's pre-existing knowledge. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA 
L. REV. 331 (1960). 
124. A witness's unavailability removes the opportunities for observation and cross-examination. 
Weinstein, supra note 123, at 333. But see United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(although the witness invoked the marital privilege and so was "unavailable," her live testimony 
in a companion case gave the trial judge an opportunity to observe her; two juries had been 
empaneled to hear most of the evidence in both cases simultaneously). 
125. Davenport, supra note 114; Weinstein, supra note 123, at 331; The Supreme Court, 
supra note 40, at 188-89. 
126. See supra note 122. Examples of evidence bearing on credibility for which the declarant 
need not be present include information concerning reputation, inconsistent statements, prior 
acts, and motive to falsify. 
127. See supra-notes 115 & 116. Weinstein, supra note 123, at 336, 350 (courts should highlight 
hearsay for the untrained jury; where excludable hearsay is admitted without objection at trial, 
it should be given whatever weight it. is entitled to under the circumstances). See also Westen, 
supra note 65, at 598-99 (juries are well-equipped to evaluate hearsay because its limitations 
are self-evident). 
128. See United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982). 
129. 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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trucks in which drugs had been found. The court noted, in deciding 
to admit the testimony, that the unavailable man was not under in-
vestigation as a participant in the crime and had not been granted 
immunity. 130 Thus, the witness "had no motive to testify falsely." 131 
Victims, in comparison, constitute a somewhat less reliable category 
of witnesses 132 because they were involved in the crime and are interested 
in the trial outcome. The possible desire for revenge makes a victim 
less trustworthy than the Mastrangelo "third party" witness. 133 Never-
theless, victims may simply testify truthfully and rely on the criminal 
justice system to punish wrongdoers. 134 As a general rule, a victim's 
testimony is not so inherently unreliable that it violates due process. 
In Stovall v. Denno, 135 for example, the Supreme Court upheld the 
admissibility of a suspect identification which was conducted at a 
hospital because the victim was too severely injured to make the trip 
to jail. 136 
Accomplices, co-defendants, and paid informants constitute the least 
reliable category of witnesses. 137 Although it is difficult to assess the 
degree to which their personal interests - both financial and penal 
- will influence testimony before the grand jury, 138 the accuracy and 
completeness of their testimony is suspect. Such witnesses are likely 
to shift blame or try to curry the prosecutor's favor. If immunity is 
granted, the total or qualified insulation from future criminal sane-
130. Id. at 391. The witness had been murdered only hours before he was due to testify. 
The judge declared a mistrial and a second trial was scheduled for ten months later. The pretrial 
ruling on the admissibility of the grand jury testimony was based on a Roberts confrontation 
analysis, not due process grounds; the court specifically rejected the argument that a finding 
of confrontation waiver was necessary. Id. at 390 n.5. 
131. Id. at 391. 
132. See, e.g., Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981); Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 
1229 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899 (1981); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Blakey, 607. F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1979). 
133. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text. 
134. See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. 
135. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
136. The special status of victims is also recognized when assessing probable cause for search 
and seizure under the fourth amendment. Information received from victims is considered more 
trustworthy than that received from ordinary informants. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note I, 
at 289. The analogy is imperfect, however, because while a victim may be highly motivated to 
be truthful in order to help police apprehend a wrongdoer, there is less disincentive to lie to 
ensure conviction once the accused is in custody. 
137. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 138 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[C]er-
tain kinds of hearsay ... are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, 
that jurors cannot be trusted to give- such evidence the minimal -weight it logically deserves, whatever 
instructions the trial judge might give." (citations omitted). This case involved a co-defendant's 
confession). 
138. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); Black v. Woods, 
651 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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tions may encourage embellishment by the witness. 139 Moreover, close 
connections to the defendant's allegedly criminal activities may com-
promise reliability by making the witness more fearful of retaliation 
by the defendant or his associates. When these sorts of witnesses are 
involved, the court's due process review must be especially scrupulous, 
for it is the testimony of accomplices and informants which is likely 
to be most incriminating and to play a vital role in meeting the govern-
ment's burden of proof. 140 
The problems associated with the grand jury testimony of co-
conspirators were explored in United States v. Gonzalez, 141 where a 
convicted drug smuggler refused to testify at the trial of the man who 
allegedly hired him. The court characterized the witness's dilemma as 
"either testifying and exposing his family and himself to retaliatory 
injury by other criminals, or not testifying and incurring prolonged 
confinement ... for contempt." "[T]he important thing to him," the 
court concluded, "was that he gave an answer, be it truth or not." 142 
Even under the comparatively lenient due process standard, 143 the high 
probability that such grand jury testimony will be unreliable makes 
it a likely candidate for exclusion at trial. 144 
B. The Testimony 
The substance of the grand jury testimony, and the manner in which 
it is elicited, can be a useful indication of its reliability. If the transcript 
reveals few leading questions, for example, a judge may reasonably 
conclude that the witness had sufficient opportunity to express fully 
and impartially all the facts within his knowledge. 145 Although con-
temporaneous cross-examination is the pref erred method for ensuring 
accuracy and completeness, a comprehensive and unbiased account may 
be worthy of consideration. 146 
139. United States v. Thevis, 66S F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982). 
See also United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) (embellishment is unlikely when 
it would harm the witness's boyfriend). 
140. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
141. S59 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977). 
142. Id. at 1272-73. But cf. United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 936 (1978) (co-conspirator's grand jury testimony admissible.) 
143. See supra notes 11S-16 and accompanying text. 
144. This, of course, assumes that countervailing factors - such as the degree of detail and 
corroboration - fail to compensate for the questionable source. See infra notes 145-169 and 
accompanying text. 
14S. See supra note 85. 
146. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, l~I (1970) (contemporaneous cross-examination 
is not required if "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
prior statement."). Cf. supra note 9 (cases finding grand jury testimony adequately reliable for 
admission, relying on theories other than due process). 
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A statement's reliability is also enhanced if it is detailed147 and reflects 
first-hand experiences of the witness. 148 In Spinelli v. United States, 149 
the Court focused on the degree of detail present in hearsay offered 
to establish probable cause for a search warrant. It noted that "when 
confronted with such detail, [a magistrate] could reasonably infer that 
the informant had gained his information in a reliable way." " 0 
Moreover, in a series of suspect identification cases, is, the Court has 
considered the level of certainty demonstrated by a witness and the 
length of time that elapsed between the events in question and the 
witness's identification. These factors may also provide insight into 
the perception, memory, and sincerity of unavailable grand jury 
witnesses. 1s2 
C. Corroboration and Subsequent Events 
Examining the ''totality of circumstances'' requires looking beyond 
the witness's identity and the characteristics of the testimony itself to 
events subsequent to the grand jury proceedings, including those oc-
curring during the trial, and to the overall scheme of proof. 1s3 
147. Compare United States v. West, S74 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978), United States v. Garner, 
S74 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978), and United States v. Mastrangelo, 
S33 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (detail enhances reliability), with United States v. Gonzalez, 
S59 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) Oack of detail suggests testimony is not trustworthy). Cf. Spinelli 
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (informant's detailed account implies reliability) (dictum). 
148. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982). While detailed 
testimony from personal knowledge suggests that the witness's perception and memory are trust-
worthy, it is not a guarantee of sincerity. Cf. FED. R. Evm. 602 ("personal knowledge" re-
quirement); McCORMICK. supra note 23, § 10 (observation requirement is "[o]ne of the earliest 
and most pervasive manifestations" of the common law's "insistence upon the most reliable 
sources of information."). See also supra notes 83-84 (double hearsay is less reliable). 
149. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
ISO. Id. at 417 (discussing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (19S9)). 
151. Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
152. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (detailed discussion of eleme_nts contributing 
to reliability of "show-up" suspect identification; no due process violation). 
153. The Supreme Court has suggested that different standards would apply when assessing 
confrontation clause challenges, depending on whether or not evidence is "crucial" or 
"devastating." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970) (plurality opinion). Although the Court 
never elaborated on this point and has not used the distinction in its later confrontation analysis, 
the "crucial/devastating" language (or a paraphrase) often appears in lower court opinions. See, 
e.g., United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that the function of the 
characterization is "unclear"); Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229, 1231, 1234 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 4S4 U.S. 899 (1981); United States v. Marks, 58S F.2d 164, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Roberts, S83 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1080 
(197.9); United States v. Rogers, S49 F.2d 490, S00-01 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 
918 (1977); United States v. Yates, S24 F.2d 1282, 1286 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 197S); United States 
v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 95S, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923, 92S (5th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (197S); United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971). 
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Events occurring after grand jury proceedings may influence an assess-
ment of the trustworthiness of testimony. In some cases, witnesses have 
reaffirmed154 or recanted 155 their previous testimony; in others they have 
disappeared, 156 died, 157 or refused to be sworn at trial. 158 Although 
definitive conclusions about the accuracy of the testimony or the 
credibility of the witness cannot be drawn from such developments, 159 
failure to testify under suspicious circumstances inevitably suggests that 
credible and ~amaging testimony would have been elicited at trial. 160 
The plausibility of an explanation for a witness's change of heart or 
absence - or the lack of an explanation - may reflect on the trust-
worthiness of his earlier testimony before the grand jury. Such develop-
ments are therefore a factor relevant to due process analysis. 
More importantly, the significance of a grand jury transcript will 
vary from trial to trial. It may be offered to prove a key element of 
the offense, or only to establish some subsidiary fact. 161 There may 
The meanings of "crucial" and "devastating" are unclear. Evidence might be "crucial" in 
that it relates directly to an essential element of the offense, rather than merely to some relevant 
but peripheral point. Or, evidence relating to any fact might be "crucial" because it is the sole 
way to prove that fact. Given this second interpretation, it is anomolous to require more cor-
roboration to establish the reliability of "crucial" evidence, because the very existence of cor-
roboration renders the disputed evidence less "crucial." "Devastating" may be synonomous with 
"crucial" in this context, although it suggests a concern with prejudice as well as with sufficiency. 
In light of the Roberts approach to confrontation, the "crucial/devastating" characterization 
seems irrelevant: evidence that meets the threshold of the reliability test ought to be admitted, 
whether "crucial" or cumulative. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text. In contrast, 
the significance of a particular piece of evidence is important for due process purposes. Due 
process imposes a requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970). Therefore, if evidence of questionable reliability plays a minimal role in 
the overall scheme of proof and is corroborated, the due process standard may be satisfied, 
while if it is crucial or devastating, it may offend due process. This interpretation of the 
crucial/devastating characterization also solves a practical problem. When a party seeks to intro-
duce a particular item of evidence, the judge may find it difficult to evaluate its significance 
immediately. Once the prosecution has presented its entire case, however, the relative value of 
the evidence will become apparent. See generally The Supreme Court, supra note 40, at 196-99. 
Cf. United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982) (comprehensive discussion of relevant 
considerations, applying Roberts confrontation analysis). 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 914 (1976). 
155. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Garner, 
574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978). 
156. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Cf. Lenza v. Wyrick, 66S F.2d 804 
(8th Cir. 1981) (extrajudicial statements of missing witness admitted). 
157. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 
57 (1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978). 
158. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Gonzalez, S59 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.· denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). 
159. The problem of completeness remains as well. See supra note 73. 
160. See supra note 102. 
161. Compare United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (grand jury testimony 
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be corroborating evidence, or the grand jury testimony may be the 
sole item of support for a particular point. 162 When corroborating 
evidence establishes the accuracy of factual assertions contained in the 
testimony, its reliability is enhanced. In United States v. Garner, 163 
for example, an unavailable 164 co-conspirator's grand jury testimony 
concerning joint travel was corroborated by a traveling companion's 
live testimony as well as by airline tickets, customs declarations, passport 
endorsements, and hotel registrations. 165 In many cases, however, the 
corroboration will be only partial, and it will not ensure that the un-
corroborated parts of the testimony are equally accurate or that the 
testimony is complete and unbiased. Nevertheless, corroborating 
evidence militates in favor of admitting grand jury testimony. 166 It indi-
cates that at least some aspects of the testimony are accurate and it 
provides the defendant with alternative opportunities to attack the 
government's case167 when one of the usual mechanisms - cross-
examination - is limited. 168 The ability to defend is an essential com-
ponent of due process fairness. 169 
CONCLUSION 
The admission of the grand jury testimony of a witness who is unavail-
able at trial implicates competing values that are fundamental to the 
criminal justice system. On the one hand, society has a strong interest 
in pursuing criminal prosecutions and assuring that the best evidence 
"crucial" to link the defendant to the crime), with United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (grand jury testimony used to rebut defendant's alibi). 
162. Compare United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978) (grand jury testimony 
corroborated by photographs, taped conversations, and live testimony), with United States v. 
Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979) (defendant only "marginally" linked with crimes without 
grand jury testimony), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). 
163. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978). Again, analysis was based 
on confrontation and not due process grounds. 
164. The witness in this case did take the stand and answered some questions posed by defense 
counsel, though he refused to respond to others posed by both the defense and the prosecution. 
Id. at 1143. 
165. Id. at 1144-45. 
166. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mur-
phy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Ward, 
552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 850 (1977). But cf. Davenport, supra note 114, 
at 1390 (objecting to bootstrapping). 
167. See, e.g., United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135 (4th Cir. 1978) (although the 
grand jury witness had died, the government agents who had supervised his undercover work 
appeared and were subject to cross-examination; defense counsel also presented evidence of his 
past criminal record to impeach the missing witness). 
168. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra note 106. 
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will be available for the prosecution to use at trial. On the other hand, 
the Constitution assures defendants of a fair opportunity to def end 
themselves within the adversary model. This represents both a sym-
bolic commitment to basic notions of justice and a practical concern 
for accurate and efficient criminal adjudication. Applying the confron-
tation test of the Roberts Court, however, the grand jury testimony 
of an unavailable witness must be excluded at trial. Even if a defendant 
waives the right to confront, due process requires that evidence lack-
ing minimal guarantees of reliability not be admitted. 
There is little reason to fear that this understanding of Roberts will 
result in many lost convictions, for alternatives to the use of grand 
jury transcripts exist: the prosecutor can memorialize critical testimony 
by holding preliminary hearings 110 or by taking depositions. 171 Ultimate-
ly, convictions must be based on proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt; given the requirements of confrontation and due process, the 
grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness has a limited role to 
play in tipping the balance. 
-Barbara L. Strack 
170. In Roberts, for example, Ohio conducted the preliminary hearing in addition to a grand 
jury proceeding. See supra note 31. See also supra note 2 (states tending to switch from indict-
ment to information). See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 20-21 (jurisdictional 
variations in the use of preliminary hearings, grand juries, and double review). 
171. The right to take depositions in criminal cases is usually more limited than in civil litiga-
tion. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) with FED. R. C1v; P. 26(a). See generally CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 1168-70. 

